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The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proven for different protocols, in
particular for the BB84 protocol. It has been shown that this scheme is robust against eventual
imperfections in the state preparation, and sending only three different states delivers the same
secret key rate achievable with four states. In this work, we prove, in a finite-key scenario, that the
security of this protocol can be maintained even with less measurement operators on the receiver.
This allows us to implement a time-bin encoding scheme with a minimum amount of resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most popular protocol used in quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) is without any doubt the BB84 protocol,
firstly presented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1].
The security of this protocol against general attacks has
been proven in various scenarios [2–6]. A more realistic
scenario of imperfect sources (state preparation errors)
was considered at first by Gottesman, Lo, Lu¨tkenhaus
and Preskill (GLLP) [7]. Afterwards Tamaki et al. [8]
proved that the security could be achieved also in a loss
tolerant scenario (Eve cannot use the loss of the channel
to enhance her attack in the presence of state preparation
imperfections). This work also demonstrated that not all
four BB84 states are actually needed and an equal secret
key rate (SKR) can be achieved with only three prepared
states.
However in all these security proofs of the BB84 pro-
tocol, it was always considered the possibility of mea-
suring, at Bob’s side, the received states in the Z and
X basis. In our paper we relax this condition showing,
in a finite-key scenario, that projections on only three
states at Bob’s side are enough to precisely estimate all
security parameters. This protocol simplification is then
applied to a recent time-bin encoding scheme that allows
for a simple and practical experimental implementation.
For instance our protocol can be implemented by using
only one modulator at Alice’s side and two detectors at
Bob’s side [9]. Although it is true that even in a stan-
dard BB84 protocol, any experimental scheme with only
two detectors could be implemented thanks to active de-
tection basis choice or detection multiplexing, this sim-
plification always comes with additional practical limita-
tions. For instance the active choice of basis requires an
active modulator which increases the complexity of the
system and introduces additional insertion loss. On the
other hand, temporal multiplexing the output increases
the complexity, the loss and possibly reduces the maxi-
mum achievable repetition rate. Our scheme, however, is
implementable with passive basis choice and can exploit
the maximum rate of acquisition of the system [10].
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II. THREE-STATE BB84 AND SIMPLIFIED
MEASUREMENT AT BOB’S SIDE
In our scheme we suppose that Alice sends to Bob two
states in the basis Z and only one in the basis X, as
in the three-state BB84 protocol [11–14]. The Z basis
(data line) is used to exchange the secret key and the
X basis (monitoring line) has the purpose of estimating
the information leaked to a third malicious party (Eve).
However, we allow Bob to measure the incoming signals
in the Z basis or project them onto only one state in
the X basis, taking always into account that a possible
measurement result is the no-detection event. In this sce-
nario, in the monitoring line, Alice sends one eigenstate
(|+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉) /√2) of the X basis and Bob measures
only the state orthogonal to it (|−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉) /√2).
With these premises, the protocol can be presented as
Alice sends to Bob three possible states, i.e. |0〉, |1〉 and
|+〉. Since the channel or the adversary can introduce
loss, a no detection event is represented by the state |∅〉.
As in most QKD security analysis, we conservatively as-
sume that Eve can completely control this eventuality.
The only thing that limits her is the basis independent
detection efficiency condition. This means that Eve is
unable to control the efficiency of detection depending
on Bob’s basis choice.
In the GLLP security analysis [7] the phase error rate
(ex) is given by:
ex =
p(−|+) + p(+|−)
p(−|+) + p(+|+) + p(+|−) + p(−|−) , (1)
where p(jB |jA) is the probability of Bob detecting the
state jB when Alice sent the state jA. In our protocol
we have no direct way to measure the probabilities where
either Alice sends the state |−〉 or where Bob measures
the state |+〉. However in a scenario where an attacker
is limited to collective attacks and the probabilities of
choosing the bases Z and X are (for the moment) equal,
it can be shown that the phase error (ex) is estimated
precisely by the available probabilities:
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2ex =
p(−|+)∑
i,j=0,1
p(i|j)
+M
1 + p(−|+)−
∑
i=0,1
(p(−|i) + p(i|+))∑
i,j=0,1
p(i|j)
 , (2)
where M(y) ≡ max(0, y).
To obtain Eq. (2), note that in the framework consid-
ered the attack of Eve can be modelled with a unitary
transformation in the Hilbert space HA ⊗HE where HA
is the space of states sent by Alice and received at Bob’s
side and HE is the space of ancilla’s states possessed by
Eve. The states take the form of:
UAE |jA〉A|φ〉E =
|0〉A|φ0jA〉E + |1〉A|φ1jA〉E + |∅〉A|φ∅jA〉E , (3)
where jA ∈ {0, 1} and |φj
′
Z
jA
〉
E
are unnormalized states
in Eve’s hand. Hereafter we will omit the subsystems
labels whenever the context allows it. The transforma-
tion UAE |±〉|φ〉 is just a linear combination of the two
previous relations given by Eq. (3). In the framework
of colletive attacks, the eavesdropper is constrained to
do the same transformation on each pulse, but she can
delay her measurement (by storing her states in a quan-
tum memory) until the classical communication between
Alice and Bob has been finished. We remark that the
attack considered by Eq. (1) is not the most general col-
lective attack possible. In fact, Eve, in principle, could
send states to Bob with multiple photons. However the
high number of parameters to consider makes an analyt-
ical result difficult to calculate. The analysis carried out
here, even if not completely general, might be proven to
be enough for security once a squashing model [15–19]
for the detection scheme is provided.
In order to prove that Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are equiv-
alent, it is sufficient to evaluate the conditional proba-
bilities (after the considered collective attack from the
eavesdropper) in case of a perfect BB84, which in our
protocol are given by the general expression:
p(jB |iA) = |〈jB |UAE |iA〉|φ〉|2. (4)
III. TIME-BIN ENCODING
The simple implementation presented in the previous
section gives already an understanding of the limitation
and capabilities of eliminating one of the typical mea-
surement projections from the original BB84 scheme. Al-
though such analysis is already complete it has some mi-
nor drawbacks: the previous formula of the phase error
Alice Bob
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Fig. 1. State generated and measured by Bob in a standard
time-bin protocol.
rate (Eq. (2)) depends on detection events on both the
data and monitoring lines. From a practical point of
view, it might be more convenient to estimate the phase
error rate only using the monitoring basis, where all the
bits are usually disclosed between Alice and Bob.
In the detection scheme that we propose, we overcome
this limitation. This method is based on a time-bin
encoding scheme, where the states sent by Alice cor-
responds to |0〉 = |1〉e|0〉l, |1〉 = |0〉e|1〉l and |+〉 =
1√
2
(|1〉e|0〉l + |0〉e|1〉l) (Fig. 1) where the subscripts e and
l represent the early and late time-bins, respectively.
Bob’s detections in the Z basis correspond to a de-
tection in one of the corresponding time-bins, while the
monitoring line is composed by an unbalance interfer-
ometer as shown in Fig. 2, that allows to measure the
coherence between the two time-bins within a state. The
action of the optical elements in front of the detectors,
in the data and monitoring lines, can be described by
the unitary transformations UZB and UXB respectively (see
Fig. 1). The data line transformation corresponds, triv-
ially, to the identity, since no optical element appears
before the detector. The monitoring line maps the in-
coming state into six different possible states. The new
states are encoded in two spatial modes, given by the
two outputs of the interferometer (t, r), and three tem-
poral modes ti labelled by the subscript i = 0, 1, 2. This
detection scheme can be modelled by the unitary trans-
formation UXB as following:
UXB |0〉A = 12 [|t0〉B − |t1〉B ] + 12 [|r0〉B + |r1〉B ]UXB |1〉A = 12 [|t1〉B − |t2〉B ] + 12 [|r1〉B + |r2〉B ]UXB |∅〉A = |∅〉B
(5)
Since the only output monitored is the one correspond-
ing to the states |ti〉, a projection in one of the |ri〉 states
results in a no-detection event. Considering Eve’s trans-
formation, given by Eq. (1), the states received at Bob’s
monitoring line have the form:
3UXB UAE |jA〉A|φ〉E =
1
2
(|t0〉B − |t1〉B + |r0〉B + |r1〉B) |φ0jA〉E
+
1
2
(|t1〉B − |t2〉B + |r1〉B + |r2〉B) |φ1jA〉E
+ |∅〉|φ∅jA〉. (6)
In this scenario the conditional probabilities p(jB |iA)
can be calculated as in Eq. (4) and the phase error rate
can be expressed as:
ex =
p(t1|+)
2
∑
i=0,1
∑
j=0,2
p(tj |i)
+M
1 + 12 (p(t1|+)− p(t1|Z))− p(tside|+)∑
i=0,1
∑
j=0,2
p(tj |i)
 , (7)
where p(t1|Z) = p(t1|0) + p(t1|1) and p(tside|+) =
p(t0|+) + p(t2|+) (see Sec. VI for the derivation of
Eq. (7)).
It can be easily verified that all the terms in Eq. (7)
depend only on the possible detections in the monitoring
line at Bob’s side, b ∈ {t0, t1, t2}. The reason why this
is possible becomes clear when we explicit the POVM
elements of the monitoring line measurement, Mb:
Mt0 =
1
4 |0〉〈0| = 14 |1, 0〉〈1, 0|,
Mt1 =
1
2 |−〉〈−| = 14 (|1, 0〉 − |0, 1〉)(〈1, 0| − 〈0, 1|),
Mt2 =
1
4 |1〉〈1| = 14 |0, 1〉〈0, 1|,
M∅ = 121 +
1
2 |0, 0〉〈0, 0|+ 14 (|0, 1〉〈1, 0|+ |1, 0〉〈0, 1|) .
(8)
From this expression we can directly see that the
POVM’s elementsMt0 andMt2 correspond to projections
on the Z basis, with the exception of a renormalization
factor. This opens the possibility of a further simplifi-
cation of our scheme. Indeed, what we defined in our
scheme as the monitoring line, could be used both as the
monitoring and data lines. The side peaks of the inter-
ferometer (i.e. the pulses at the times t0 and t2) could
be regarded directly as the data line and the estimation
of the phase error rate would be unchanged. This gives
the possibility of using only one detector for the whole
scheme.
IV. EFFICIENT ENCODING SCHEME
In a time-bin encoding scheme one important param-
eter to consider is the size of the temporal mode. Once
this parameter is fixed, the minimum temporal width of
the qubit state is limited at two temporal modes (see
Fig. 3). Although this solution (Fig. 3b)) is the most
Alice Bob
t
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D
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X
Fig. 2. Experimental setup of a three-state BB84 time-bin
encoding protocol. Alice has a pulsed laser source and encodes
the states in two possible time-bins. Bob, after a passive
basis choice done by a beam splitter (BS) can measure in two
different bases. In the Z basis, the measurement consists only
in measuring the arrival time of the photons. Instead, the X
basis consists in measuring the interference of the two time-
bins. In this scheme, only one output port of Bob’s Michelson
interferometer is monitored. The interferometer is composed
by a beam splitter and two Faraday mirrors (FM).
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Fig. 3. a) The simplest implementation of a time-bin encod-
ing scheme. The time difference between two different states
is greater than three times the time-bin duration. In this way
the three possible detection times on the monitoring line are
not overlapped. b) The most efficient time bin scheme: in
this case the time difference between two different states is
exactly the total time duration of a state (two time-bins). In
this case the early detection time-bin in the monitoring line
depends on both the current pulse and the previous one.
efficient in terms of qubit repetition rate it raises some
difficulties in our analysis. The problem appears in the
monitoring line where, if we define a pair of states sent by
Alice as |jm−1〉|j′m〉, we have that the detections |t2,m−1〉
and |t0,m〉 are indistinguishable (they overlap in time).
This fact does not allow us to directly measure all the
probabilities of the form p(b|j) where b ∈ {t0, t2} and
j ∈ {0, 1,+}. However, assuming that two identically
encoded states are indistinguishable one from the other,
we can evaluate the sum of the detection probabilities
corresponding to the states |t0〉 and |t2〉 when two con-
secutive identical states are prepared. More precisely,
we define in the monitoring line the possible detections
as early (|em〉) and late (|lm〉) where this two time-bins
have the same temporal separation as the preparation
state (see Fig. 3b)). It can be easily verified that the
4late detection |lm〉 depends only on the state sent in the
mth round. On the other hand the detection in the early
bin |em〉 depends both on the current mth round and on
the previous one (m− 1)th. When we send two identical
states |j〉 one after the other, i.e. |jm−1〉|jm〉 ≡ |j〉|j〉, we
have the following relation:
p(t0|j) + p(t2|j) = p(e|j, j), (9)
where on the left side the probabilities p(t0|j) and p(t2|j)
are the probabilities of detection due only to one prepa-
ration state. In this way we can express the phase error
rate, given by Eq. (7) as follows:
ex =
p(l|+)
2
∑
i=0,1
p(e|i, i) +M
1 + 12p(l|+)∑
i=0,1
p(e|i, i)
−
1
2p(l|Z) + p(e|+,+)∑
i=0,1
p(e|i, i)
 , (10)
where we consider only detection events in the early or
late time-bins of the monitoring line and where p(l|Z) =
p(l|0) + p(l|1).
The difference between evaluating each probability in-
dependently and coupling the states in pairs appears only
when we pass from conditional probabilities to joint prob-
abilities (this passage is convenient for the decoy-state
analysis presented in the next section). In fact, to evalu-
ate the joint probabilities we apply the following relations
for the early (e) and late (l) time-bins respectively:
p(e, j, j) = p(e|j, j)p(j, j) = p(e|j, j)p(j)2, (11)
and
p(l, j) = p(l|j)p(j). (12)
We can now rewrite the phase error formula with these
new definitions:
ex =
α
2
p(l,+)∑
i=0,1
p(e, i, i)
+M
1 + α
2
p(l,+)∑
i=0,1
p(e, i, i)
−βp(l, Z) + αp(e,+,+)∑
i=0,1
p(e, i, i)
 , (13)
where α = p2z/(4(1 − pz)), β = pz/4 and pz, px are the
probabilities that Alice emits a state in the Z and X bases,
respectively.
Note that instead of using p(t0|+)+p(t2|+) = p(e|++)
as indicated in Eq. (9), it is possible to use an equivalent
relation (in case of perfect state preparation), given by:
p(t0|+) + p(t2|+) = p(e|0+) + p(e|+ 1). (14)
This holds since the state |0〉 should in principle give no
contribution in the detection time-bin |t2〉 and the state
|1〉 should behave in the same way for the detection time-
bin |t0〉. This correction is done in order to increase the
available number of events to estimate these probabilities
since the probability to send a state in the X basis is
usually much lower than the probability to send a state
in the Z basis in order to maximize the SKR.
V. DECOY-STATE PARAMETER ESTIMATION
The analysis carried out until now considers a single-
photon source. Unfortunately such a source, that pro-
duces single photons deterministically and with high rep-
etition rate, is not yet available. In QKD and related
technologies, this kind of sources is typically replaced by
weak coherent pulses, which opens possible side channels
exploitable by an eavesdropper, due to the presence of
multiphoton pulses [20, 21].
Amongst the different possible solutions to solve this
issue [22–25], the most frequently employed and most
practical is the decoy-state method [26–28], where Al-
ice sends to Bob phase-randomized weak coherent pulses
with different intensities in order to bound the number
of detections at Bob’s side due to single-photons (D1).
The security of this protocol has been proven in different
kinds of configurations with limited number of intensi-
ties [29–31]. For our analysis we choose the implementa-
tion with only one decoy [29, 32]. With this analysis we
can upper bound the phase error rate associated to the
single-photon contributions by the following expression:
D1(ex) =
α
2
D1(n(l,+))
D1(n(e, ZZ))
+M
(
1 +
α
2
D1(n(l,+))
D1(n(e, ZZ))
− βD1(n(l, 0) + n(l, 1))
D1(n(e, ZZ))
−αD1(n(e, 0+) + n(e,+1))
D1(n(e, ZZ))
)
, (15)
where n(e, ZZ) = n(e, 00) + n(e, 11) and n(b, j) is the
number of experimentally observed detections at Bob’s
side when Alice sent a weak coherent pulse encoded in
the |j〉 state. In the considered one-decoy state protocol
with finete-key corrections [32], two different intensities
k ∈ {µ1, µ2} are chosen for each state. In the finite-key
regime, the number of detections associated to single-
photon events D1(n), where n =
∑
nk could be any kind
of detection at Bob’s side, is bounded by the following
equations:
5D1(n) =
τ1µ1
µ2(µ1 − µ2)
(
n−µ2 −
µ22
µ21
n+µ1
+
(µ21 − µ22)
µ21
(
D0(n)
τ0
))
, (16)
D1(n) =
τ1
µ1 − µ2
(
n+µ1 − n−µ2
)
. (17)
where τ0 and τ1 are the total probabilities to send a vac-
uum state and a single-photon state respectively; n±k is
the finite-key correction, obtained by using the Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality [33], of the number of detections due to
the state of intensity k ∈ {µ1, µ2}:
n±k :=
ek
pk
(
nk ±
√
n
2
log
1
ε
)
. (18)
where pk is the probability to send a state of intensity k.
The number of vacuum events D0(n) is estimated using
the sequence of states |01〉 and measuring in the late time
bin |l〉 in the monitoring line:
D0(n(b, j, j)) =
p(j, j)
p(01)
n(e, 01) + δ
(
p(j, j)
p(01)
n(e, 01), ε
)
, (19)
where δ(n, ε) =
√
(n log ε−1)/2.
We chose this sequence because, in case of perfect
preparation of the state, the only contribution to this
event is a vacuum state detection (where Alice sends
a vacuum state and Bob has a detection). In case of
possible preparation errors in these two states, the de-
tections considered could depend also on non-vacuum
events, however this poses no treat to the security of the
protocol since the quantity considered is still an upper
bound on the considered events.
Then the SKR is given by the following formula [32]:
l ≤ D0Z +D1Z(1− h(D1(ez)))− λEC
− 6 log2(19/sec)− log2(2/cor), (20)
where D0Z and D1Z are the lower bounds of the vac-
uum events and single-photon events when Alice and Bob
choose to send and to measure in the Z basis, D1(ez) is
the upper bound on the phase error rate associated to the
single-photon contributions (obtained following the pro-
cedure in [32] and we omit it here for simplicity), λEC is
the number of disclosed bits in the error correction stage
and sec and cor are the secrecy and correctness param-
eters. The phase error rate in the Z basis D1(ez) is ob-
tained from the error rate in the monitoring line D1(ex)
by a finite key correction given by the formula [31]:
D1(ez) ≤ D1(ex)
+ γ
(
εsec, D1(ex), D1Z , D1(n(e, ZZ))
)
, (21)
where:
γ (a, b, c, d)
=
√
(c+ d)(1− b)b
cd log 2
log2
(
c+ d
cd(1− b)b
212
a2
)
. (22)
VI. SECURITY PROOF
In this section we show the procedure to obtain Eq. (7).
According to Eq. (3), when Alice sends a state in the Z
basis we have that:
UAE |0〉|φ〉 = |0〉|φ00〉+ |1〉|φ10〉+ |∅〉|φ∅0〉,
UAE |1〉|φ〉 = |0〉|φ01〉+ |1〉|φ11〉+ |∅〉|φ∅1〉,
(23)
and for the X basis:
UAE |±〉|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉(|φ00〉 ± |φ01〉)
+|1〉(|φ10〉 ± |φ11〉) + |∅〉(|φ∅0〉 ± |φ∅1〉)
)
, (24)
where |φji 〉 for i, j = 0, 1, ∅ are Eve’s quantum states
(not necessarily normalized). By using the state trans-
formation at Bob’s monitoring line given by the Eq. (5),
we can calculate the probability that Bob detects |b〉,
with b ∈ {∅, t0, t1, t2}, when Alice prepares |a〉, with
a ∈ {0, 1,+}. In fact the states received by Bob after
Eve’s attack have the form given by Eq. (6).
Knowing the explicit form of these states and using
Eq. (4), we can express all the possible conditional prob-
abilities in the monitoring line (corresponding to measur-
able events) in terms of Eve’s ancilla states:
p(t0|0) = 12 〈φ00|φ00〉,
p(t1|0) = 12
[〈φ00|φ00〉+ 〈φ10|φ10〉 − 2Re(〈φ00|φ10〉)] ,
p(t2|0) = 12 〈φ10|φ10〉,
p(∅|0) = 〈φ∅0|φ∅0〉,
p(t0|1) = 12 〈φ01|φ01〉,
p(t1|1) = 12
[〈φ01|φ01〉+ 〈φ11|φ11〉 − 2Re(〈φ01|φ11〉)] ,
p(t2|1) = 12 〈φ11|φ11〉,
p(∅|1) = 〈φ∅1|φ∅1〉,
(25)
and
p(t0|+) = 14
[〈φ00|φ00〉+ 〈φ01|φ01〉+ 2Re(〈φ00|φ01〉)] ,
p(t1|+) = 14
[〈φ00|φ00〉+ 〈φ01|φ01〉+ 〈φ10|φ10〉+ 〈φ11|φ11〉
−2Re(〈φ00|φ10〉) + 2Re(〈φ00|φ01〉)− 2Re(〈φ00|φ11〉)
−2Re(〈φ10|φ01〉) + 2Re(〈φ10|φ11〉)− 2Re(〈φ01|φ11〉)
]
,
p(t2|+) = 14
[〈φ10|φ10〉+ 〈φ11|φ11〉+ 2Re(〈φ10|φ11〉)] ,
p(∅|+) = 12
(〈φ∅0|φ∅0〉+ 〈φ∅1|φ∅1〉+ 2Re(〈φ∅0|φ∅1〉)) .
(26)
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Fig. 4. Comparison between a standard BB84 protocol with
a single-photon source (blue line) and our protocol with a
single-photon source (yellow line) and phase-randomized weak
coherent pulses (red line) with one decoy state [32]. For all
curves was considered an intrinsic error of 1% and a proba-
bility of dark counts of 10−10 with security and correctness
parameters (εsec and εcor respectively) equal to 10
−9.
Now we estimate the phase error probability in the
ideal case, where Alice is able to send the |+〉 and |−〉
states and Bob is able to measure both of them in the
X basis. In this case, following the formalism introduced
before, the phase error rate can be expressed as a function
of Eve’s ancilla states as:
ex =
p(−|+) + p(+|−)
p(−|+) + p(+|−) + p(+|+) + p(−|−) =
1− 2Re(〈φ
0
0|φ11〉+ 〈φ10|φ01〉)
〈φ00|φ00〉+ 〈φ01|φ01〉+ 〈φ10|φ10〉+ 〈φ11|φ11〉
. (27)
In our scenario where the POVM’s elements on the
monitoring line are defined following Eq. (8), we can per-
fectly reproduce the given formula using the conditional
probabilities of Eq. (25) and Eq. (26) (evaluated on mea-
surable events). After a straightforward algebraic calcu-
lation it can be verified that the phase error rate in our
protocol has the form given by Eq. (7), where the second
term is constrained to be positive since it corresponds to
the probability p(+|−).
Finally, in Fig. 4 we show the achievable SKR of our
protocol in comparison to a standard BB84 with a single-
photon source. If we consider the single-photon source
case, there is almost no difference except for really high
attenuation. In this regime, where the errors increase
due to the dark-counts of the detectors, our protocol
is more affected, in the phase error estimation than a
standard BB84 protocol. This is due to the fact that,
in our protocol, there are three time-bins considered in-
stead of two. However this difference is well compen-
sated by the simplification of the implementation and
allows, anyway, to achieve record breaking distances for
QKD [10]. Moreover, by implementing our protocol with
phase-randomized weak coherent pulses and one-decoy,
we achieve a high SKR compared to that of single-photon
sources (see Fig. 4).
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOKS
We have presented a simple and practical scheme that
not only employs a limited amount of preparation states
(three states and two pulse intensities when implemented
with coherent pulses) but also allows us to use a simpler
detection scheme. The next step in the security proof
would be to introduce a complete analysis against coher-
ent attacks. However we can already state that, since
this protocol uses a phase-randomized source, techniques
such as Azuma’s inequality [25, 34] and the quantum De
Finetti’s theorem [35] can be directly applied.
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